Alexander Greenberg | PhD Thesis
Part Two (Ch. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. In Chapter Two, I discuss various attempts to argue that belief is subject to a truth norm on the basis of the explanatory role of such a norm in the philosophy of mind. Such attempts typically argue that we need to think of the attitude of belief as. These features can be explained by much weaker claims than the truth norm,. Reason for thinking belief is subject t...
Alexander Greenberg | Papers
Sacrifices for the Greater Epistemic Good? It is often claimed that true belief is the fundamental goal of epistemic justification. Call this claim ‘veritism’. Particular examples are alleged to create problems for this claim: examples in which having a belief that looks prima facie unjustified is a means to the end of having a large number of other true beliefs. In a series of recent articles, Selim Berker has argued that these examples should lead us to reject veritism.